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CRIMINAL SANCTIONS AGAINST POLLUTERS:
THE EPA'S ASBESTOS PROBLEM
ADAMO WRECKING CO. V UNITED STATES
434 U.S. 275 (1978)
The purpose of the Federal Clean Air Act' was to create a uni-
form, national system of controls upon emission of air pollutants.
2
Originally passed in 1955,1 the Act empowered the Department of
Health Education and Welfare to administer its provisions.4 Ulti-
mately it came under the auspices of the Environmental Protection
Agency.5
Although the Act was designed to achieve praiseworthy ends, it
failed to stem significantly the increasing flood of industrial pollutants
into the atmosphere. Much of the problem lay in a fundamental mis-
conception of the roles which the federal and state governments would
assume. Although air pollution is a national problem, the drafters of
the Act believed that the states should individually assume the role as
primary enforcers of pollution control.6 The EPA became merely a
1. Hereinafter referred to in the text and in footnotes as the Clean Air Act.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b) (1970) provided:
(1) The purposes of this subchapter are to protect the quality of the Nation's air re-
sources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its
population;
(2) to initiate and accelerate a national research and development program to achieve
prevention and control of air pollution;
) to provide technical and financial assistance to State and local governments in con-
nection with the development and execution of their air pollution prevention and control
programs; and,
(4) to encourage and assist the development and operation of regional air pollution
control programs.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (Supp. III 1952) for the text of the Clean Air Act as it was passed by
the United States Congress in 1955.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (Supp. III 1952). This version of the law referred to the "Secretary of
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare." See 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (Supp. III 1952).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1857a (1970). This version of the statute refers to the "Administrator" of the
Environmental Protection Agency. The Environmental Protection Agency will hereinafter be
referred to in the tekt and in footnotes as the EPA.
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(b) (Supp. V 1959-63). That statute provided:
(b) Consistent with the policy declaration of this subchapter, municipal, State and in-
terstate action to abate air pollution shall be encouraged and shall not be displaced by
Federal enforcement action except as otherwise provided by or pursuant to a court order
under subsection (g) of this section. (Emphasis added).
Even though the states were the primary administrators of the Clean Air Act, the federal
government did retain some measure of enforcement power if the states failed to act. However,
the federal enforcement role was strictly limited. First, only injunctive relief could be obtained;
no criminal sanctions were available. Second, the Secretary had to wait a minimum of six months
before federal enforcement action could even be considered.
As provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(c)(4) (Supp. III 1965-67):
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clearinghouse for information on technological developments in the
area of pollution control and a planning agency whose expertise was
available to the states.7 This diffusion of power among the states
proved totally inadequate to insure effective enforcement of the Act.
In 1970 Congress passed a sweeping and boldly innovative amend-
ment to the Clean Air Act.' Perhaps the most important contribution
of the new legislation was to centralize enforcement powers in the EPA.
Thus, Congress eliminated the power vacuum that had haunted the
original Act. In particular, section 113 of the Amendments delegated
to the EPA Administrator the right to seek various civil and criminal
sanctions for violations of the Act.9
The Amendments to the Clean Air Act further specifically author-
ized the EPA to promulgate "emission standards" for hazardous air
pollutants.' 0 Emission standards generally set a numerical limitation
upon the amount of pollution that can be lawfully discharged into the
atmosphere." These standards were to be set at a level, which, in the
Administrator's informed judgment, "provides an ample margin of
Whenever, on the basis of surveys, studies and reports, the Secretary finds that the ambi-
ent air quality of any air quality control region or portion thereof is below the air quality
standards established under this subsection, and he finds that such lowered air quality
results from the failure of a State to take reasonable action to enforce such stand-
ards. . . .If such failure does not cease within one hundred and eighty days from the
date of the Secretary's notification, the Secretary-
(i) in the case of pollution of air which is endangerin& the health or welfare of persons
in a State other than that in which the discharge. . . originate, may request the Attorney
General to bring a suit on behalf of the United States . . .to secure abatement of the
pollution.
7. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2 (Supp. III 1965-67), the Secretary was empowered to set air
quality criteria:
(b)(1) The Secretary shall, after consultation with appropriate advisory committees and
Federal departments and agencies. . . develop and issue to the States such criteria of air
quality as in his judgment may be requisite for the protection of the public health and
welfare. . . .(2) Such criteria shall accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge
useful in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on health and welfare
which may be expected from the presence of an air pollution agent...
More importantly, the Secretary was to provide the latest technological data on pollution
abatement devices:
(c) The Secretary shall, after consultation with appropriate advisory committees and
Federal departments and agencies, issue to the States . . .information on those recom-
mended pollution control techniques the application of which is necessary to achieve
levels of air quality set forth in criteria. . . Such recommendations shall include such
data as are available on the latest available technology...
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Amendments].
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(b),(c) (1970). Subsection (b) allows the Administrator to commence
a civil suit for a permanent or temporary injunction. Subsection (c) provides for criminal penal-
ties for violations of certain pollution control orders issued by the Administrator.
More importantly, under section 112 of the Amendments, the Administrator is free to act
with or without State participation: "Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the Administrator
from enforcing any applicable emission standard under this section." See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-
7(d)(2) (1970).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(b)(l)(A) (1970).
11. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.32, 61.42, 61.52 (1977). These sections set out emission stand-
ards for three compounds classified as hazardous pollutants: beryllium, mercury and chlorides.
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safety to protect the public health."
1 2
Unlawful emission of hazardous pollutants was subject to the
harshest criminal sanctions provided for in the Amendments. 3 Viola-
tors of these standards, which were set forth in the federal regulations,
could be penalized by fines up to $25,000 per day and imprisonment of
not more than one year.'4 A petition for review of the promulgation of
any EPA emission standard could be filed only in the Circuit Court of
the District of Columbia and was not subject to review in subsequent
civil or criminal proceedings. 15
The EPA Administrator discovered, however, that emission stand-
ards, which were strictly numerical, were impractical tools of enforce-
ment in some instances.' 6 Certain types of emissions were either
difficult to detect or defied accurate measurement by present technol-
ogy.' 7 In such cases, the Administrator imposed a "work practice" stan-
dard.' 8 The work practice standard did not restrict pollution in
numerical terms.' 9 Rather, this type of standard defined the methods
by which certain hazardous pollutants could be handled, removed and
transported to minimize the release of the toxic substance into the at-
mosphere.2 °
The Amendments left unclear whether emission standards and
work practice standards were synonomous and therefore subject to the
same regulations. This precise question was presented to the United
States Supreme Court in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States.2  In
Each of these standards sets upper limits upon the amount of discharge of these pollutants which
is allowed. The limits are expressed in numerical terms as parts per million.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(b)(1)(B) (1970).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(c)(1) (1970) provides:
Any person who knowingly - . . . . (C) violates . . . section 1857c-7(c) (concerning
enission standards) of this title shall be punished by a fine of not more than $25,000 per
day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than one year or both ...
14. Id
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1970). This statute provides, in relevant part:
(1) A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any national
fprlmar or secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission standard under section
1857c7 of this title... may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. . . Any petition shall be filed within 30 days from the date of such
promulgation, approval, or action, or after such date if such petition is based solely on
Srounds arising after such 30th day.
2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been obtained
under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceed-
ings for enforcement.
16. Letter from Russell E. Train to Gerald R. Ford, March 22, 1974, citedin United States v.
National Wrecking Co., No. 74 CR 755 (N.D. IlL. Dec. 20, 1974).
17. Id
18. Id
19. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.22(d)(4)(i)-(v) (1977).
20. Id.
21. 434 U.S. 275 (1978).
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Adamo, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the EPA's
designation of work practice standards as emission standards was a
proper exercise of rule-making power. The issue was of great signifi-
cance in the overall scheme of regulation of hazardous pollutants be-
cause if a work practice standard was not authorized by statute, the
EPA virtually would be foreclosed from controlling the discharge of
toxic chemicals which cannot be measured numerically.
The Supreme Court found that the EPA had exceeded its statutory
authority in promulgating work practice standards. The Court con-
cluded that, as a matter of statutory construction, the EPA only had
power to issue numerical limitations upon the discharge of pollutants.
Work practice standards were an unjustifiable extension of the EPA's
legislative mandate.22
The Adamo decision has resulted, at least temporarily, in the ex-
clusion of certain toxic pollutants from regulation by the EPA. If Con-
gress does not act to clarify the statute, the Adamo decision could cause
a serious deterioration of our national environment.
This comment will discuss in detail the conflicting federal court
interpretations of the Clean Air Act. The opinion in Adamo Wrecking
Co. v. United States will be examined carefully in an effort to elucidate
the significant policy considerations in the area of criminal due process
which may have influenced the Supreme Court's decision. The serious
impact that the Adamo decision may have upon the EPA as the admin-
istrative agency whose duty it is to enforce the Act will also be ana-
lyzed. Finally, suggestions will be presented for a technical amendment
to the Clean Air Act which would, in effect, legislatively reverse
Adamo.
NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY
The controversy in Adamo involved two distinct but interdepen-
dent issues of statutory construction. The first issue centered upon the
type of regulatory scheme that the EPA could use to enforce limitations
upon the emission of asbestos. Asbestos is a versatile compound that
has been used in the construction industry for decades. Its unique
chemical properties make it an ideal insulator and fireproofing mate-
rial. Asbestos is most often found in buildings as a chemical component
in floor tiles and as an insulating material packed around pipes, boilers
and furnaces.23 As useful as asbestos is to the building trade, it is a
22. Id at 574-75.
23. Horvitz, Asbestos and Its Environmental Impact, 3 ENVT'L AFF. 145 (1974).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
toxic pollutant when released into the air as dust or shredded fibers
during demolition.24
Unlike other hazardous pollutants, asbestos is not regulated in
terms of a numerical emission standard. During demolition of a build-
ing the discharge of asbestos filaments and dust is virtually impossible
to measure. Because of this, the EPA Administrator originally pro-
posed an emission standard that would have prohibited any "visible
emissions"25 from commercial demolition operations. However, after
realizing that demolition of many structures would be rendered impos-
sible if visible emissions of asbestos were entirely prohibited, the Ad-
ministrator determined that a total ban was not a practical solution.
Rather, in response to the necessity of regulating asbestos, the Adminis-
trator promulgated the work practice standard as a more reasonable
method of controlling asbestos pollution.26 The asbestos work practice
standard required that the asbestos be wet down prior to demolition.27
The wetting procedure ideally would cause the asbestos in the building
to congeal into a lumpy mass, thereby vastly reducing the likelihood
that shredded filaments could escape into the air, as they would if the
asbestos were dry and easily crumbled.
2
1
Although the work practice standard seemed to be a reasonable
compromise between the requirements of industry and the interest of
the public in a healthy environment, the EPA's authority in this area
was far from clear. Without doubt, criminal charges could be brought
against persons who violated numerical emission standards. 29  But it
was questionable whether similar charges could be sustained when a
work practice standard was in issue.
The petitioners for the demolition company in Adamo contended
that Congress intended emission standards to be strictly numerical lim-
itations upon pollutant discharges. Work practice standards therefore
24. Id at 146 (citing S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 6, 1970)). This report
states:
Because nothing has been done about the hazards of asbestos, even after the association
of asbestos and lung cancer was first reported in 1935, 20,000 out of the 50,000 workers
who have since entered one asbestos trade alone- insulation work-are likely to die of
asbestosis, lung cancer or mesothelioma. Nor is the potential hazard confined to these
workers, since it is estimated that as many as 3.5 million workers are exposed to some
extent to asbestos fibers.
25. 36 Fed. Reg. 23242 (1971).
26. 38 Fed. Reg. 8820 (1973).
27. 40 C.F.R. § 61.22(d)(4)(iii) (1977) specifically provides:
Pipes, ducts, bottle tanks ...or structural members that are insulated or fire-proofed
with fiable asbestos materials may be taken out of any building. . . provided the fiable
asbestos materials exposed during cutting or disjointing are adequately wetted during the
cutting or disjointing operation. ...
28. Id
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(c)(1) (1970).
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exceeded the EPA's statutory authority.3"
The EPA countered this argument with a two-pronged analysis.
First, if a work practice standard was not a valid emission standard,
emission of asbestos, unlike other categories of hazardous pollutants,
would not be subject to stiff criminal penalties. Thus, the asbestos
work practice standard should be viewed as a species of emission stan-
dard, designed to achieve the same result as a numerical standard.
Second, the Administrator's actions in promulgating the asbestos stan-
dard could be construed as banning the emission of asbestos entirely.
The numerical emission standard for asbestos would then be zero. If
the demolition company conformed to the work practice standard,
however, the EPA would waive strict compliance with the numerical
emission standard of zero parts per million. The numerical compo-
nent of the emission standard would thereby be retained, even though
the work practice guidelines would have effectively replaced it.3I
The second issue presented in Adamo was whether Congress had
granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia to decide any controversies arising under the Clean Air
Act.32 The EPA contended that any challenge to the federal regulations
could be brought only in that forum. 33 Petitioners for the demolition
industry argued that the role of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia was to insure that the regulations promulgated by the Ad-
ministrator were neither arbitrary nor capricious. District courts, con-
tended the petitioners, could not be foreclosed on jurisdictional
grounds from considering whether a particular regulation was an emis-
sion standard within the statutory meaning of that term.34
The practical differences between the conflicting interpretations of
the jurisdictional controversy is critical. From the viewpoint of the
defendants, members of the demolition industry involved in criminal
trials, their procedural due process rights were at stake. Historically, the
burden was on the government to prove every element of the alleged
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.35 Yet if a work practice standard
could be irrebuttably presumed to be an emission standard by the
30. See, e.g., Defendant's Reply Memorandum in United States v. National Wrecking Co.,
No. 74 CR 755 (N.D. II. Dec. 20, 1974).
31. See, e.g., Government's Response Brief in United States v. National Wrecking Co., No.
74 CR 755 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 1974).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(l) (1970).
33. See Government's Response Brief in United States v. National Wrecking Co., No. 74
CR 755, mem. op. at 11-14 (N.D. I11. Dec. 20, 1974).
34. See Defendant's Reply Memorandum in United States v. National Wrecking Co., No.
74 CR 755, mem. op. at 10 (N.D. I11. Dec. 20, 1974).
35. LAFAVE & ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 146 (1972).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
EPA's mere designation, at least one element of the alleged criminal
conduct could be immunized from challenge by the defense in the pro-
ceeding.36 The burden on the government would therefore be light-
ened. Conversely, the defense would be handicapped since it would be
denied a potentially fruitful avenue of attack upon the charges.
From the EPA's perspective, the demise of jurisdictional exclusiv-
ity for hazardous pollutant regulation could be disastrous. Uniformity
of decision-making would be undermined. Instead of a single appel-
late court exercising exclusive jurisdiction, each district court in the
country could be free to examine the nature of the standards. A multi-
plicity of conflicting decisions and prolonged litigation over what ele-
ments constitute an emission standard would no doubt result. Thus,
effective and prompt enforcement of pollution control regulations
would be thwarted to the ultimate detriment of the national goal of a
safe and healthy environment.
THE ANATOMY OF AN EMISSION STANDARD
Prior to Adamo, the first courts to consider these issues were the
district courts for the northern district of Illinois. Four cases against
demolition companies were prosecuted simultaneously.37 Each in-
volved virtually identical fact patterns. The defendant companies had
torn down buildings which contained asbestos-insulated boilers and
pipes. None of the defendants had followed the work practice stand-
ards specified in the regulations.
Each information filed against the companies was dismissed upon
motion by the defendants.38 The narrowest ground for dismissal was
that the informations, as drafted by the United States attorney, failed to
charge that the demolition companies had actually caused the dis-
charge of asbestos into the atmosphere.39 The informations simply al-
36. See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932), in which the Supreme Court held unconsti-
tutional the irrebuttable presumption that a gift made within 2 years of death was "in contempla-
tion of death" for federal estate tax purposes. The Clean Air Act does not go so far as to create an
irrebuttable presumption that any standard is an emission by the Administrator's mere designa-
tion. As a practical matter, however, the same result occurs in a criminal enforcement proceeding
if the validity of the standard is not susceptible to challenge by the defendant.
37. United States v. Brandenburg Demolition, Inc., No. 74 CR 757 (N.D. II. Jan. 31, 1975);
United States v. Harvey Wrecking Co., No. 74 CR 758 (N.D. I11. Jan. 7, 1975); United States v.
Nardi Wrecking Co., No. 74 CR 756 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 1975); United States v. National Wrecking
Co., No. 74 CR 755 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 1974).
38. Id.
39. See Memorandum Opinion of Judge Bernard Decker in United States v. National
Wrecking Co., No. 74 CR 755, mem. op. at 2 (N.D. I11. Dec. 20, 1974) which states, "The informa-
tion does not charge that any air pollutant was emitted in violation of the standard; it charges only
that the standard was violated."
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leged that the defendants had carried on demolition without following
the procedures prescribed in the federal regulations.4 0 Because the in-
formations did not allege with specificity that the defendants had com-
mitted a prohibited act, they were found to be fatally defective.
Each memorandum opinion went beyond the narrow issue of the
sufficiency of the informations, however, and considered whether the
EPA could seek criminal sanctions for violation of a work practice
standard.4 ' Each of the opinions decided that the EPA could not.
The critical question confronting each court was whether a work
practice standard was a species of emission standard. The courts held
that language previously employed by the Administrator compelled a
finding that the two standards were quite different in nature. In a let-
ter from Russell Train, former EPA Administrator, to Gerald Ford,42
certain proposed amendments to the Clean Air Act were discussed.
The Administrator stated:
Although EPA can establish Federal emission standards . . .for
sources emitting hazardous pollutants, there are occasions where
emission limitations are not the most practical method of control.
For example, emission standards are not appropriate in cases where
emissions from a source are difficult to measure .. . .EPA is re-
questing authority to set design or equipment standards for. . . haz-
ardous pollutants whenever the limitations of measurement
technology make emission standards impractical. .. .
The Administrator also drew a clear line of demarcation between the
two standards when he decided not to promulgate a visual emission
standard for asbestos:
[T]he no visible emission requirement would prohibit repair or dem-
olition in many situations, since it would be impracticable, if not im-
possible, to do such work without creating visible emissions.
Accordingly, the promulgated standard specifies certain work prac-
tices which must be followed when demolishing certain buildings or
structures.
44
These admissions by the Administrator were construed strongly against
him in each decision. His language clearly indicated that work prac-
tice standards were merely techniques designed to achieve lower emis-
40. Id
41. The opinions in Nardi Wrecking Co., Harvey Wrecking Co., and Brandenburg
Demolition all concurred or cited with approval Judge Decker's reasoning in National Wrecking
Co. Judge Decker examined work practice standards in his Memorandum Opinion. No. 74 CR
755, mem. op. at 3-4 (N.D. I11. Dec. 20, 1974).
42. Letter from Russell E. Train to Gerald R. Ford, March 22, 1974, cited in United States v.
National Wrecking Co., No. 74 CR 755 (N.D. II1. Dec. 20, 1974).
43. Id
44. 38 Fed. Reg. 8820 (1973).
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sions of asbestos, not emission standards in themselves.45
Thus the EPA lost its first test in the courts on the grounds that
work practice and emission standards were distinctly different methods
of regulation and that the Clean Air Act did not give the EPA authority
to promulgate work practice standards.
JURISDICTIONAL EXCLUSIVITY
The northern district of Illinois cases remained the only opinions
in this area until United States v. Adamo Wrecking Co.4 6 was decided
by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The indictment in
Adamo was drafted to avoid the pitfalls which had befallen the Illinois
cases.4 7  Nonetheless, the EPA again lost its case in the district court48
for virtually the same reasons as those expressed by the Illinois courts
in dicta.
The Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court. It did not address di-
rectly the work practice-emission standard dichotomy.49 Instead, the
court focused exclusively upon the district court's jurisdiction to deal
with the validity of EPA standards.50 The Sixth Circuit found that
section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act foreclosed review of EPA standards
by the district courts.5" The court concluded that the only forum avail-
able for any challenge to the Administrator's action was the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia.52  Congress had exercised its
constitutional prerogative of limiting the jurisdiction of certain federal
courts in the statute. Jurisdictional exclusivity applied whether the ba-
sis for the challenge was the procedure by which the regulations were
adopted or whether it was an attack upon the substance of the regula-
45. United States v. National Wrecking Co., No. 74 CR 755, mem. op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
20, 1974).
46. 545 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1976).
47. The indictment clearly specified that the defendants had caused the discharge of asbestos
into the atmosphere. The informations in the northern district of Illinois cases had only alleged a
violation of federal regulations. Id at 3.
48. Id.
49. Although the court determined that the definition of an "emission standard" was not
essential to its decision, it did address the issue in a footnote. The court stated:
We note, of course, that appellee claims that no matter what the Administrator called
this regulation, it was a 'work practice' standard rather than an 'emission standard.' We
see nothing inconsistent with the purposes of this statute in the Administrator's promul-
gation of a 'work practice' as a condition of an emission standard which, absent fulfill-
ment of the work practice conditions, otherwise prohibits any emission of particulate
asbestos material into the ambient air.
545 F.2d at 6 n.2.
50. Id at 4.
51. Id at 6.
52. Id (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(l) (1970)).
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tions themselves. 3
Exclusivity of review is not a novel practice. The United States
Supreme Court had confronted a similar statutory provision over thirty
years before in Yakus v. United States.54 The Sixth Circuit specifically
relied upon Yakus in reaching the Adamo result.
The controversy in Yakus arose under the Emergency Price Con-
trol Act of 1942.15  The statute contained provisions, enforceable by
criminal penalties, prohibiting the wilful sale of agricultural products
above the prices set forth in regulations.56 The statute allowed chal-
lenges to the maximum price regulations set by the Price Administrator
within sixty days of their promulgation.5' Review of the regulations
was exclusively granted to the Emergency Court of Appeals.5 The
defendants in Yakus did not avail themselves of this judicial forum.
Rather, they chose to attack the regulation on statutory and constitu-
tional grounds in the enforcement proceeding.
The Supreme Court in Yakus upheld the convictions of the de-
fendants. The Court emphasized that the defendants had failed to ex-
haust their administrative and judicial remedies:
As we have seen, Congress, through its power to define the jurisdic-
tion of inferior federal courts and to create such courts for the exer-
cise of the judicial power, could, subject to other constitutional
limitations, create the Emergency Court of Appeals, give it exclusive
equity jurisdiction to determine the validity of price regulations pre-
scribed by the Administrator, and foreclose any further or other con-
sideration of the validity of a regulation as a defense to a prosecution
for its violation. 59
Thus, to the extent that the defendants had a reasonable opportunity to
be heard and to present evidence, further judicial review of the matter
could be foreclosed consistent with due process.
60
The Sixth Circuit in Adamo found further support for its decision
in the legislative history of the Clean Air Act. The question of exclu-
sive judicial review had been considered by the Senate. The pertinent
Senate report explained that the District of Columbia Circuit had been
granted exclusive jurisdiction in order to assure "even and consistent
53. Id at 4-5.
54. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
55. Pub. L. No. 1, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
56. Pub. L. No. I, ch. 26 § 3(a), 56 Stat. 23, 27 (1942).
57. Pub. L. No. 1, ch. 26, § 203(a), 56 Stat. 23, 31 (1942).
58. Pub. L. No. 1, ch. 26, § 204(a), 56 Stat. 23, 31 (1942).
59. 321 U.S. 414, 443 (1944).
60. Id
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application" of the standards .6  Uniformity of decision-making by the
courts was a key purpose of the Congress. The Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that the demolition company had neither challenged the regula-
tion in a timely manner nor in the appropriate forum.62 The district
courts were therefore barred from hearing the company's defense.
The court recognized that its holding was at variance with the de-
cisions rendered by the courts for the northern district of Illinois. It
distinguished those cases on the ground that the informations, as
drafted, were fatally defective.63 The portions of the memorandum
opinions which considered the work practice-emission standard dichot-
omy were merely unpersuasive dicta according to the court.64 Thus, the
Sixth Circuit found it unnecessary to reach the crucial issue of whether
a work practice standard was a species of emission standard.65  Its
holding was based on narrow jurisdictional grounds, rather than on the
substantive claim.
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court granted certiorari66 in the Adamo case in or-
der to resolve the conflicting interpretations as to the types of defenses
available for violations of the Clean Air Act and to decide where juris-
diction would properly lie. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the major-
ity,67succinctly phrased the issue as: "When is an emission standard not
an emission standard?
'68
Resolution of the Jurisdictional Controversy
The Court first addressed the jurisdictional issue, and initially
noted that the Clean Air Act provided a complex interrelationship be-
tween judicial review of EPA actions and criminal sanctions. Subsec-
tion A of the penalties provision of the Act punished violation of
implementation plans after notice has been given to the violator.69
Subsection B was a very broad clause which imposed criminal sanc-
tions upon "any person who knowingly. . . violates" orders issued by
61. 545 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1976) (citing S. REP. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 40-42
(1970)).
62. 545 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1976).
63. Id
64. Id
65. Id. See note 49 supra for the court's discussion of the emission standard issue.
66. 430 U.S. 953 (1977).
67. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Burger, Jus-
tices White, Marshall and Powell joined. Justice Powell also filed a concurring opinion.
68. 434 U.S. 275, 278 (1978).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(c)(1)(A) (1970).
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the Administrator, including record-keeping and inspection require-
ments.7" Finally, subsection C, the specific part of the Amendments in
issue in Adamo, made violations of emission standards punishable by
criminal penalties.7' Violations of other provisions of the Act were
merely enforceable by injunction or civil suit for damages.72 Within
the framework of particularly harsh criminal sanctions for the violation
of an emission standard, the Court turned to consideration of the juris-
dictional controversy.
The first hurdle was Yakus, upon which the Sixth Circuit had re-
lied as authority. The Court distinguished Yakus on the grounds that
the Clean Air Act went far beyond the relatively simplistic provisions
of the Emergency Price Control Act.73 Unlike Yakus, there was a
complex, interlocking system of civil as well as criminal penalties under
the Clean Air Act. Congress had singled out violators of emission
standards for particularly harsh treatment and had subjected them to
penalties which would not be imposed upon violators of other sections
of the Act.7" More importantly, certain defenses could possibly be de-
nied them, which could be asserted by violators of other orders of the
Administrator.75 The Court considered these rules particularly harsh
for the small businessman. 76 To protect his interests, the small busi-
nessman must keep constantly abreast of proposed emission standards
in the Federal Register. The Court reasoned that only by immediate
court action initiated in the District of Columbia could a party be as-
sured that a forum would be available to hear his claim.
Because of these severe limitations upon the defenses that could be
raised in a criminal proceeding, the Court carefully scrutinized the stat-
ute to determine if jurisdictional exclusivity was intended by Congress
in this case. The Court concluded that the statute was sufficiently am-
biguous as to create a doubt about Congressional intent.77 Since the
due process rights of a criminal defendant were involved, the Court
determined that the ambiguity of the statute must be construed in favor
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(c)(I)(B) (1970).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(c)(1)(C) (1970).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(b) (1970).
73. 434 U.S. 275, 283 (1978).
74. Id
75. Id
76. Id at 283 n.2.
77. Id at 283. The Court stated,"... Congress intended, within broad limits, that 'emission
standards' be regulations of a certain type, and that it did not empower the Administrator, after
the manner of Humpty Dumpty in 'Through the Looking Glass,' to make a regulation an 'emis-
sion standard' by his mere designation."
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of the defendant.78 Therefore, the Court concluded that the district
courts were courts of competent jurisdiction to consider whether an es-
sential element of the indictment or information, the alleged emission
standard, was in fact such a standard as envisioned by Congress.79
The Court tempered the scope of its ruling, however, with a strict
limitation upon the issues which the district courts could consider.
The district courts could not probe into the nature of the proceedings
under which the regulation was promulgated nor could they consider
whether the regulation was arbitrary or capricious. 80  An administra-
tive review proceeding of this sort was the sole province of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. The district courts could only
decide if the purported regulation was indeed an emission standard.
Thus, regulations would not be open to wholesale challenge in the vari-
ous districts. The possibility of conflicting decisions and years of liti-
gation over various provisions of the Act would be greatly reduced.
The Court's Deofnition of an Emission Standard
Having concluded that jurisdiction was proper in the district
courts, the Court turned to the issue of whether a work practice stan-
dard could be construed as an emission standard. The Court deter-
mined that the two standards were quite distinct. An emission
standard was a quantitative limit upon the lawful discharge of pollu-
tants into the atmosphere, while a work practice standard was a
technique designed to reduce pollutant emissions.8
The language of section 112(b)(1)(B)82 supported the Court's inter-
pretation. The Court stated, "The Administrator shall establish any
such standard at the level which in his judgment provides an ample
margin of safety to protect the public health from such hazardous air
pollutant."83  The term "level" implies a quantitative measurement.
A work practice standard is not a measurement, but a methodology
78, Id at 285 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971), and Rewis v. United
States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
79. Id at 285.
80. Id The Court's holding on the jurisdictional issue was deliberately narrow. The Court
stated:
The narrow inquiry to be addressed by the court in a criminal prosecution is not whether
the Administrator has complied with appropriate procedures in promulgating the regula-
tion in question, or whether the particular regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or sup-
ported by the administrative record. . . .The question is only whether the regulation
which the defendant is alleged to have violated is on its face an 'emission standard'
within the broad limits of the congressional meaning of that term.
81. Id. at 286.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(b)(l)(B) (1970).
83. 434 U.S. 275, 286 (1978).
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which can be used to achieve acceptable levels of pollutant discharge.
Logically, the two types of standards are distinguishable.
The Court found that the Administrator himself had adopted this
distinction several years before.84 Indeed, the work practice standard
was adopted only after a numerical emission standard had not proved
feasible.85 Significantly, Congress itself had endorsed this view during
discussion of the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. The Senate
report at that time re-emphasized its "strong preference for numerical
standards."86 Furthermore, the report supported the addition of sec-
tion 112(e) to the Act, which would allow the Administrator to promul-
gate work practice standards.87 By implication, the Administrator did
not have such powers previously.
The Court concluded that work practice standards were not syno-
nomous with emission standards. Neither the criminal penalties provi-
sion of the Act nor the provision for jurisdictional exclusivity were
applicable to work practice standards. In effect, the Court decided that
the asbestos work practice standard was unenforceable.
Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stewart and Justice Stevens wrote dissenting opinions in
Adamo. Justice Stewart's opinion" basically reiterated the conclu-
sions reached by the Sixth Circuit when it considered the Adamo case
originally. Stewart concluded that the majority's reasoning circum-
vented the plain intent of Congress that actions of the Administrator
should not be subject to review in any civil or criminal enforcement
proceeding.89 He noted that Congress, in order to assure uniformity of
interpretation of the Clean Air Act, had unambiguously provided for
exclusive judicial review of any actions taken by the Administrator in
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.90 Further evidence
of Congress' intent, Justice Stewart said, lay in the section of the Act
which limited the time for appeals to thirty days.9' He concluded,
therefore, that Congress' overriding concerns were twofold: that deci-
sion-making be prompt and that judicial interpretation of this complex
piece of legislation be uniform.
84. 38 Fed. Reg. 8821 (1973).
85. Id
86. 434 U.S. 275, 289 (1978) (citing S. REP. No. 95-127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1977)).
87. Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 14(a)(79), 91 Stat. 1404 (1977).
88. Justices Brennan and Blackmun concurred in Justice Stewart's opinion.




Justice Stewart noted that the majority's interpretation conflicted
with both of these goals. First, the decision undermined uniformity
since various district courts were free after Adamo to decide what ele-
ments constituted an emission standard.92 Second, the tortuous proce-
dures inherent in the appellate mechanism and inevitable lengthy
delays would inevitably frustrate the purpose of Congress in establish-
ing a strict time limit for appeals.93 Thus, Justice Stewart reasoned
that review of the Administrator's action was to be available in only
one forum. Since the petitioner demolition company had not availed
itself of that opportunity, it should be barred from raising the emission
standard issue in a subsequent enforcement proceeding.
Justice Stevens, in contrast to Justice Stewart, focused exclusively
upon the work practice-emission standard dichotomy. Stevens felt
that the jurisdictional argument was based on the unarticulated prem-
ise that the asbestos regulation was a bona fide emission standard
under section 307(b). 94 Only an emission standard was subject to the
exclusive review provision of the statute. Therefore, according to Jus-
tice Stevens, Justice Stewart's argument begged the ultimate question.
Justice Stevens found it necessary to consider the nature of an
emission standard in detail. He noted that when Congress passed the
Clean Air Act Amendments in 1970, it was gravely concerned about
the health hazard posed by asbestos emissions.95 Congress went so far
as to express its determination to accept factory closings as the price for
control of asbestos pollution.96 Consequently, Justice Stevens argued:
[tihere is no evidence that Congress intended to require the Adminis-
trator to make a choice between the extremes of closing down an
entire industry and imposing no regulation on the emission of a haz-
ardous pollutant; Congress expressed no overriding interest in using
a numerical standard when industry is able to demonstrate that a less
drastic control technique is available, and that it provides an ample
margin of safety to the public health.97
Congressional intent, in the eyes of Justice Stevens, was clear and un-
ambiguous. The EPA had been given authority to reduce asbestos
emissions through the use of techniques which provided an "ample
margin of safety" for the public.
92. Id
93. Id
94. Id at 294 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id at 296-97 n.8 (citing A Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,
Ser. No. 93-18, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1971)).
96. Id at 296.
97. Id. at 298-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens buttressed his reasoning by citing one of the ele-
mentary rules of statutory construction, i.e., that when presented with
an ambiguous statute the judiciary should give great weight to the con-
struction which the agency charged with its administration has placed
upon it.9 8 Under this rule, the agency's construction need not be the
only reasonable interpretation. It need only be sufficiently reasonable
under all the circumstances. 99 Therefore, according to Justice Stevens,
even if "emission standard" is an ambiguous term, the Court should
have deferred to the Administrator's interpretation, which included
work practice standards. too
Finally Justice Stevens noted that the majority opinion had misin-
terpreted the history of the 1977 Amendments to the Act. As intro-
duced in the Senate, the 1977 Amendments clearly specified that a
design, equipment or operational standard was a type of "hazardous
emission standard." '' When the bill emerged from conference, how-
ever, it no longer precisely defined a work practice standard as a species
of hazardous emission standard.102 The conference report explained
that the change in language was meant to clarify an unrelated part of
the Senate bill.'03 Thus the Amendments neither confirmed nor con-
flicted with the Administrator's contention that he had authority to en-
force work practice standards.
CRITIQUE
The decision in Adamo leads to the anomalous result that the EPA
can promulgate work practice standards,"° but has no means by which
to enforce them. Congress, in the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air
Act, did not amend section 112(c), which permitted enforcement of
"emission standards" only. Since the Adamo Court determined that
work practice standards were not a category of emission standard, the
criminal penalties section of the Amendment does not apply. The Ad-
ministrator is placed in the unenviable position of (1) allowing the un-
98. Id at 302 (citing Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933)).
In that opinion Justice Cardozo stated: ". . . practice has peculiar weight when it involves a con-
temporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its
machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried
and new."
99. Id at 301 (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1964)).
100. Id at 302.
101. Id at 303-04 nn.21&22 (citing Letter from Environmental Protection Agency Adminis-
trator to Senate Public Works Committee Chairman Supporting Proposed Amendments to the
Clean Air Act (Feb. 3, 1975)).
102. Id
103. Id at 304 n.23 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 131-32 (1977)).
104. Id. at 306-07.
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controlled emission of asbestos, a known carcinogen, or (2)
promulgating a numerical emission standard which would virtually
prohibit the demolition of certain structures.
The only solution to the EPA's quandry would seem to be a tech-
nical amendment to the wording of section 112(c). The language of the
amendment could clearly specify that a work practice standard is a
form of emission standard. Alternatively, the scope of section 112(c)
could be expanded to include work practice standards as well as emis-
sion standards. Violations of any work practice standard would then
be clearly enforceable under the criminal penalties provision of the
Act.
The jurisdictional portion of the holding presents a more delicate
drafting problem, one which is perhaps insurmountable. Congress
plainly intended to restrict the scope of jurisdiction and the amount of
time which a petitioner has to challenge emission standards, thereby
insuring uniformity of decision-making and prompt resolution of con-
flicts. However, the Court in Adamo distinguished Yakus, the princi-
pal case upholding jurisdictional and time bars, indicating that the
government still retained its burden of proving all elements alleged in
any criminal indictment based upon a violation of federal regulations.
The Administrator's designation of a particular standard as an emis-
sion standard was not conclusive on this key issue. In fact, Justice
Powell in his concurring opinion,'05 stated that the jurisdictional and
time bars in a criminal case might well constitute a violation of the
defendant's constitutionally protected due process rights."°6 The fo-
rum designated by Congress may not provide an adequate opportunity
for persons affected by the Act to protect their interests. Dicta in the
majority opinion tends to support this view.' The Court's holding in
Adamo thus leaves open the question of whether a statute can be
drafted to impose jurisdictional and time bars where the rights of a
defendant in a criminal case are in issue, or whether such a statute is an
unconstitutional infringement upon due process rights.
If the Court's decisions continue to limit Yakus strictly to its facts,
it could sound the death knell for prompt implementation of many fed-
105. Id. at 289 (Powell, J., concurring).
106. Id at 290. Justice Powell clearly expressed doubts as to the validity of time and juris-
dictional bars in a criminal action:
The 30-day limitation on judicial review imposed by the Clean Air Act would afford precari-
ously little time for many affected persons even if some adequate method of notice were afforded.
It also is totally unrealistic to assume that more than a fraction of the persons and entities affected
by a regulation--especially small contractors scattered across the country-would have
knowledge of its promulgation or familiarity with or access to the Federal Register.
107. Id. at 283 n.2.
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eral programs. As a policy matter, such a result could severely cripple
national programs such as the Clean Air Act and the Water Pollution
Control Act10 8 so as to make them unworkable. Ultimately, the public
health and welfare would suffer as more toxic pollutants were emitted
into the waters and air. In this respect, Adamo may have set a danger-
ous precedent.
If, however, the expansion of jurisdiction is limited to the sole is-
sue of what constitutes an emission standard, the decision can be
viewed as a reasonable compromise between the defendant's constitu-
tional rights in a criminal case and the urgent need to resolve conflicts
arising under the Act. It seems doubtful that a flood of litigation on
this narrow issue will result. Proper revision of the wording of section
112(c) to include any design, equipment or operational standard should
eliminate many spurious challenges at the district court level.
CONCLUSION
As a result of Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, emission of
asbestos, a highly toxic pollutant, is uncontrolled in the United States
today. The public health menace from this hazardous substance has
been clearly demonstrated. Congress alone can act to clarify the au-
thority of the EPA in the area of asbestos control, and thereby relegate
asbestos once again to the list of hazardous pollutants.
GEORGE MARCHETTI
108. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 11 1972).
